ABSTRACT The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is one of the most server threats to the current Internet and brings huge losses to society. Furthermore, it is challenging to defend DDoS due to the case that the DDoS traffic can appear similar to the legitimate ones. Router throttling is an accessible approach to defend DDoS attacks. Some existing router throttling methods dynamically adjust a given threshold value to keep the server load safe. However, these methods are not ideal as they exploit the information of the current time, so the perception of time series variations is poor. The DDoS problem can be seen as a Markov decision process (MDP). Multi-agent router throttling (MART) method based on hierarchical communication mechanism has been proposed to address this problem. However, each agent is independent with each other and has no communication among them, therefore, it is hard for them to collaborate to learn an ideal policy to defend DDoS. To solve this multi-agent partially observable MDP problem, we propose a centralized reinforcement learning router throttling method based on a centralized communication mechanism. Each router sends its own traffic reading to a central router, the central router then makes a decision for each router to choose the throttling rate. We also simulate the environment of the DDoS problem more realistic while modify the reward function of the MART to make the reward function of more coherent. To decrease the communication costs, we add a deep deterministic policy gradient network for each router to decide whether or not to send information to the central agent. The experiments validate that our proposed new smart router throttling method outperforms existing methods to the DDoS instruction response. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service attacks constitute one of the major cyber threats and among the most complicated security problems in today's Internet [1] - [3] . Of particular concerns are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, whose impact can be proportionally severe. With little or no advance warning, a DDoS attack can easily exhaust the computing and communication resources of its victim server within a short period of time [4] , [5] . What is worse, with the increase of Internet bandwidth and the continuous release of various DDoS hacking tools, the implementation of DDoS attacks is becoming easier [6] , and the events of DDoS attacks are on the rise [2] , [7] . Due to a variety of factors such as commercial
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The DDoS threat is challenging to defend for many reasons [4] , [8] . First, the traffic is generated from terminals spreading all over the Internet, and then all traffic is aggregated at the victim server. Second, the large volume of the aggregated traffic is unlikely to be stopped by a single defense point near the victim. Third, the DDoS traffic can appear to be similar to the legitimate one since the damage may cause by the total volume of traffic and not the traffic content.
If we could know the legitimate traffic percentage, we can easily solve the problem by Linear Programming (LP). As we can know the total traffic reading of each throttling router and suppose that we could not distinguish the legitimate traffic from attack traffic. Thus, how to reduce the total traffic to the victim server to allow the server work properly while ensuring traffic of legitimate user to access the server as much as possible is an urgent problem to be solved.
Router throttling [9] is a popular approach to defend against DDoS attacks, where the victim server signals a set of upstream routers to throttle traffic. The key element in the defense system is to allocate appropriate throttling rates at the distributed routing points. The appropriate throttles should depend on the current demand distributions, so dynamically negotiation is indispensable between the server and network routers. There are two baseline methods, Server-initiated Router Throttle (SIRT) algorithm and Fair Router Throttle (FRT) algorithm [9] . Both of SIRT and FRT adjust a given threshold value to keep the server load within [L s , U s ], L s is the low-water mark of the server load and U s is the load limits of the victim server. However, as these two methods only based on the traffic reading itself, and could not reuse the experience of past time. Thus, it is hard to make an ideal decision to set the throttling rate.
The DDoS problem can be formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [10] , [11] . Thus, the agents can do actions based on current traffic information as well as its previous experience with the network environment. Malialis and Kudenko [12] , [13] introduce Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method based on hierarchical communication mechanism, where multiple independent reinforcement learning agents are installed on a set of upstream routers and learn to throttle traffic towards the victim server. There is no communication between different router agents and each agent can only get information from its parent nodes in the network. As each agent is independent with each other, the only link is the global reward of all agents. Each agent treats the other agents as part of its environment and makes a decision of throttling rate. However, the strategies of other agents are uncertain and changing as training progresses [14] , so the environment becomes unstable from the perspective of any individual agent and thus it is hard for agents to collaborate to learn an ideal policy.
Motivated by existing research about distributed router throttling methods, we propose a Centralized Reinforcement Learning Router Throttling with Less Communication (CRLRT-LC) method to learn a better policy while decreasing the communication costs.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the DDoS attack problem and some existing router throttling methods. Details of our proposed CRLRT-LC method and its design details are introduced in Section III. Data preparation, experimental settings, performance evaluation, and the follow-up discussion are presented in Section IV. Conclusions are given in Section V.
II. DISCUSSION DDOS PROBLEM AND ROUTER THROTTLING METHODS
In this section, the DDoS attack problem and some existing router throttling methods (SIRT, FRT, and MART) will be introduced.
A. DDOS PROBLEM DEFINITION
The strategy behind the DDoS attack is described by the DDoS attack model [15] . The terminals are compromised by the attacker, which constitute the botnet. Specifically, the attacker installs malicious software on vulnerable terminals to compromise them, thus being able to communicate with and control them. The attacker communicates with the handlers, which in turn control the terminals in order to launch a DDoS attack.
Router throttling is a framework for DDoS instruction response as shown in Fig.1 . The Environment is the network topology, a server responds the request from users (or terminals). When the attack is happening, some users may be controlled by the attacker. This may lead the traffic accumulated in throttling router contains much attack traffic, which may lead the server crashed. The Agents are the throttling agents, they get State information from the environment, then respond Action to the environment and get feedback Reward from the environment. The purpose of router throttling is to keep the server work and let as much legitimate user request the server. So before the accumulated large amount of traffic reaching to the server, the throttling router should drop some traffic.
The DDoS attacks can be viewed as a resource management problem. Assume x i t is the legitimate traffic reading of router i at moment t, y i t is the attack traffic, a i t is the throttling rate, the goal is to maximize the passing rate of legitimate traffic of all nodes during a time T as shown in Equation (1) , N is the number of router agents. And subject to the conditions that the passed total traffic is less than the load limits U s as shown in Equation (2) .
As in reality, we could not know the exact value of the legitimate traffic x i t . And we can only get the sum value of x i t + y i t . The DDoS problem cannot be solved by Linear Programming (LP) method [16] , [17] to get the optimal router throttling rate a i t for each router. Thus, if we want to make decisions based on incomplete, vague information, we need to get some feedback information from the network environment to tell us whether the decision we just made is efficiency.
B. SERVER-INITIATED ROUTER THROTTLE ALGORITHM
For Server-initiated Router Throttle (SIRT) algorithm, all routers share the same throttling rate a t ∈ [0, 1]. Each router throttles a fraction a t of traffic, to make sure the traffic to victim server is within [L s , U s ] during the DDoS attack. The fraction a t is adjusted according to current server congestion. The fraction a t is zero when no throttle is in effect. If Z t (the total traffic transfered to victim server at moment t, as shown in Equation (3)) is more than U s , this method will VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. The framework of router throttling method. The throttling router (agent) will get some information (state) from the environment and decide the throttling rate of the router (action) by its own policy. Then get some feedback (reward) from the environment. The interaction data (state, action, reward, new state) will be stored in a memory buffer. The data can help the agent improve its policy.
increase the throttling rate a t . If Z t is less than L s , it will decrease the throttling rate a t , as shown in Equation (4) . Here, α, β ∈ [0, 1].
As all routers share the same throttling rate a t , this SIRT algorithm is very simple to conduct. But it is not fair because it penalizes all routers equally, irrespective of whether they are greedy or well behaving. (5), the threshold value R s (t) is updated as Equation (6) . Here, α, β ∈ [0, 1].
For attack traffic is much more than legitimate traffic, the FRT algorithm is better than the SIRT algorithm. But if the attack traffic is as much as legitimate traffic. This algorithm may get a bad result. In reality, some legitimate traffic is much more than others, for such problem, this FRT method may fail.
D. MULTI-AGENT ROUTER THROTTLING METHOD
Malialis and Kudenko [12] , [13] introduce Multi-agent Router Throttling (MART) method based on hierarchical communication mechanism, where multiple independent reinforcement learning agents are installed on a set of upstream routers and learn to throttle traffic towards the victim server.
1) REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Consider a standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) [18] , [19] , which is represented by a tuple:
S is the state space and A is the action space. The dynamic transition is specified by P(·) = Pr(s t+1 |s t , a t ) and R(·) = r(s t , a t ) assigns reward for state-action pairs. By interacting with the environment, agents generate trajectories: (s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , s 2 , · · · , s T ). The goal of reinforcement learning is to maximize cumulative reward, as Equation (8) shows, where discounted factor γ is designed to make sure cumulative reward is bound.
Similarily, Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is specified by a tuple:
Here, N is the number of agents. For specific agent i, o t i ∈ O i is its observation at the time t, a i ∈ A i is its action at the time t. Different from the standard MDP, single agent cannot get access to global information s t ∈ S. What's more, dynamic process and joint reward is determined by all agent's behaviors, which means that
). Although the team goal of MARL remains to maximize cumulative joint reward, but the target of one agent moves when other agents' polices change, which makes the optimization of MARL intractable. State Space (S): the state of each throttling router agent is the traffic reading from the server to router agent along the un-directional arrows in Fig.2 . For example, router agent R 3 in Fig.2(b) ) has four-dimensional, they are the traffic reading of server R s , team leader R 1 , intermedia router R 2 and the traffic reading of itself R 3 . Thus, for throttling router agent
Action Space (A): each router applies to throttle via probabilistic traffic dropping. For example, action 0.2 means that the router will drop 20% of its aggregate traffic towards the victim server. The available action space is [0, 1].
Reward Function (R): for the basic Multi-agent Router Throttling (MART) [9] , [16] method, each agent receives the same reward or punishment. The system has two important goals, which are directly encoded in the reward function as shown in Equation (10) . The first goal is to keep the victim server operational, that is, to keep its load below the upper boundary U s . When this is not the case, the system receives a punishment of -1. The second goal of the system is to allow as much legitimate traffic as possible to reach the victim server during the DDoS attack.
3) DEEP DETERMINISTIC POLICY GRADIENT
The Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) is a modelfree [20] - [22] off-policy actor-critic algorithm using deep function approximators that can learn policies in highdimensional, continuous action spaces. It combines the actor-critic approach with insights from the recent success of Deep Q Network (DQN) [23] - [25] . The Reinforcement Learning algorithms can be divided into three groups [26] . (i) Actor-only methods typically work with a parameterized family of policies over which optimization procedures can be used directly, such as policy gradient methods [27] . (ii) Critic-only methods that use temporal difference learning have lower variance in the estimates of expected returns, such as Q-learning. (iii) Actor-critic methods aim to combine the advantages of actor-only and critic-only methods. Actor-critic [28] , [29] algorithm was generally believed that learning value functions using large, non-linear function approximators was difficult and unstable.
DQN algorithm is capable of human-level performance on many Atari video games using unprocessed pixels for input [24] . However, it can only handle discrete and lowdimensional action spaces. And cannot be straightforwardly applied to continuous domains since it relies on finding the action that maximizes the action-value function, which in the continuous-valued case requires an iterative optimization process at every step. DDPG combines the previously successful DQN structure to improve the stability and convergence of actor-critic. DDPG can learn competitive policies using low-dimensional observations using the same hyper-parameters and network structure. A key feature of the approach is its simplicity: it requires only a straightforward actor-critic architecture and learning algorithm with very few ''moving parts'', making it easy to implement and scale to more difficult problems and larger networks. Therefore, in this paper, we adopt DDPG as a base reinforcement learning method.
4) MULTI-AGENT DEEP DETERMINISTIC POLICY GRADIENT METHOD
For the DDoS problem, each throttling agent gets its own partially observation and chooses an action from action space. Then each agent gets a reward from the environment to improve the Reinforcement Learning (RL) policy. This is a cooperative task, all agents cooperate to make the largest reward, as shown in Equation (8) .
Here, we adopt the Multi-agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MADDPG) method [30] , [31] as learning agents to solve this problem. MADDPG is one of the state-of-art techniques in Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). The code refers (https://github.com/openai/maddpg). MADDPG is an extension of the actor-critic [29] , [32] model. However, MADDPG has to train an independent policy network for each agent, where each agent would learn a policy specializing specific tasks [33] based on its own observation, and the policy network easily overfits to the number of agents. Therefore, MADDPG can hardly solve large-scale MARL problems.
III. PROPOSED NEW SMART ROUTER-THROTTLING METHOD
In this section, we first give an introduction to our proposed Centralized Reinforcement Learning Router Throttling (CRLRT) method, then introduce our less communication method.
A. CRLRT WITH CENTRALIZED COMMUNICATION 1) CENTRALIZED COMMUNICATION
Effective communication is a key ability for collaborative multi-agent systems. For the above MART method, each router agent picks action solely based on local observations. It is a cooperative multi-agent extension of a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) [34] , [35] . As it is hard for those independent agents to conduct consistent to pass as much legitimate traffic as possible and at the same time make sure the total traffic is less than U s .
We adopt a centralized communication mechanism. Centralized communication tackles the partial observability problem, where distributed agents cannot sense all of the relevant information necessary to complete a cooperative task. And a centralized decision is probably better than a decentralized decision to some extent. The state space of central agent is consisted of the traffic reading of N router agents, the server available bandwidth U t s (refer (11), will be introduced below) and the server upper boundary U s . Here, the state space is N + 2 dimensional and the action space is A ∈ [0, 1] (a i = 0 means all traffic of router i will be sent to servers; a i = 1 means all traffic will be throttled). The overall framework of our CRLRT is illustrated in Fig.3 . First of all, each agent (throttling router) gets state information from the Environment (network topology as shown in Fig.1 ) and sends its own traffic reading S i to the central agent (Central DDPG). Then the central agent stores the received message into a Message Pool and makes the decision of the throttling actions for each router agent based on the message pool. After that, the central agent sends the action message A i to each agent i, each throttling router (agent) throttles part of traffic based on the action message A i , and sends the left traffic S i to the server, here S i = S i (1 − A i ). In the end, the environment will send back a reward R for the Central DDPG. We will store the [S 0 , . . . , S N , A 0 , . . . , A N , R, S 0 , . . . , S N ] into a memory buffer. The Central DDPG can improve its policy with the stored information in the memory buffer.
2) MODIFIED REWARD FUNCTION
There is some problem with the reward function of Multiagent Router Throttling (MART) method. For the DDoS problem (refer (1) and (2)). In a given state S, if agents can get excellent actions A, it can get a high reward, but if agents get actions near the optimal action and lead the total traffic more than U s , it will get a punishment-reward of −1. Thus, the reward function R(S, A) is an incoherent function for state action pair. What's more, the actions have no effect on the state of next time, thus, it is not a classical reinforcement learning problem.
To solve the above problems, we introduce the concept of the server available bandwidth U t s (U 0 s = U s ) at moment t, it is updated as shown in Equation (11) . If the total traffic Z t (after routers throttling) is more than U t s , the bandwidth of next time U t+1 s will be reduced. Otherwise, it will be increased (should be below the upper boundary U s ). When the next time U t+1 s is less than 0, the server will be crashed, and we should restart the server. Therefore, if we add the server available bandwidth U t s into the state information, the actions can have an effect on the state of next time.
Our modified reward function is shown as Equation (12), this is a coherent function for state action pair. If the total traffic Z t (after routers throttling) is less than U t s , the reward function is the same as Equation (10) . If the total traffic Z t is more than U t s , some traffic cannot be responded by the server, so the reward function should be reduced by multiplied by U t s /Z t (smaller than 1).
3) CURRICULUM LEARNING
As the reading of attack traffic can be as similar to legitimate traffic. It is difficult for agents to learn an ideal policy. We adopt curriculum learning [36] , [37] to solve this problem. The main idea of curriculum learning is to decompose a hard learning task (target task) into several simple ones (subgoal tasks) [38] . Then, the learning agent can master subgoal tasks and reuse the gathered information to solve the target task. Which is faster than directly learning in the hard task from scratch. Here, we gradually increase the variance of normal traffic, so that at the beginning we can learn a policy much more easily, then gradually increase the difficulty.
B. CRLRT WITH LESS COMMUNICATION
As each throttling router (agent) needs to send information to the central agent, each time the central agent needs to receive N (the number of router agents) times communication information. Thus, we add a DDPG network (the detail introduction refers Section II-D.3) for each agent to decide whether or not to send information M i to the central agent, as shown in Fig.4 , which is based on Fig.3 . The input of the DDPG network for each throttling router is the pool (get from the prior time) and S i , the output space of each agent is [−1,1], if the information of this time is similar to the prior information in the information pool, the router agent will not send information, otherwise it will send state information to the central agent. Then the central agent makes the decision of the throttling actions for each router agent based on the message pool and sends the action message A i to each agent i, each throttling router (agent) throttles part of traffic based on the action message A i , and send the left traffic S i to the server. In the end, the environment will send back a reward R for the Central DDPG. The Central DDPG can improve its policy with the stored information in the memory buffer.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULT ANALYSIS
In this section, we illustrate the performance of our proposed CRLRT architecture compared to SIRT, FRT, MART, and LP in both fixed attack location setting and dynamic attack location setting. All our experiments are conducted in an Ubuntu server with 64GB of RAM.
A. DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION METRICS 1) DATA COLLECTION
Prior experimental setup is based on Yau's work [9] . Each terminal is independently chosen to be a legitimate user and to be an attacker with probability to be 0.6 and 0.4. Legitimate users and attackers are to send traffic randomly and to uniformly choose from the given range [0, 1] and [2.5, 6] Mbit/s, respectively. However, this environment setting is too simple and ideal, in a real environment, the attack traffic can be as much as legitimate traffic to avoid been detected.
To validate the effectiveness of our proposed CRLRT method architecture, we adopt OPNET [39] , [40] as our network simulator to generate traffic data for our experiment. We simulate a national backbone network with 27 cities and each city has four throttling routers (total 108 router agents). As shown in Fig.5 . There is a server located in the central city. In a real network, the legitimate traffic from different scale cities is different from each other. Thus, we choose 20 throttling routers as large-scale city routers and also choose 20 throttling routers as small-scale city routers, the left routers are media-scale city routers.
We simulate server episodes of data. Each episode lasts for 500 time steps, the attack traffic lasts for 300 time steps, at each time step each router generates some new traffic to the server. At the beginning of each episode, randomly choose N att (54) throttling routers from the total N (108) throttling routers as the attack traffic. At each time, throttling routers (agents) can only sense the sum of legitimate traffic x i t and attack traffic y i t , but cannot distinguish between the two, and can select router throttling action a i t from the action range [0, 1]. The throttling action a i t = 1 means that all traffic is dropped, and a i t = 0 means all traffic can pass to the server. As heavy attack traffic can be detected easily, thus the attack traffic can be as much as legitimate traffic to avoid being detected. The legitimate traffic x i t and attack traffic y i t is considered to obey normal distribution. The load limits U s of the victim server is shown as Equation (13).
Here, x is the average of legitimate traffic, y is the average of attack traffic. δ ∈ [0, 1], N is the number of all the router agents, N att is the number of router agents been attacked.
2) EVALUATION METRICS
During our experiment, there are three metrics, the reward curve during training and test period, the passing rate of legitimate traffic and the efficiency of action E action .
For a Reinforcement Learning (RL) method, the reward function (10) is important to the training progress. In this paper, we will compare the reward curve (the change of reward in different time steps) of different methods to show the efficiency of methods.
For the DDoS problem, our goal is to keep the server not crashed and has less effect on legitimate users. Thus, the average passing rate of legitimate traffic P legitimate is the main evaluation metrics as Equation (14) . Here, x i t is the legitimate traffic reading of router i at moment t, a i t is the throttling rate, T is a period of time steps, N is the number of router agents.
We also analyze the efficiency of actions. The definition of the average attack passing rate P attack is similar to (14) , as shown in Equation (15), here y i t is the attack traffic of router i at moment t. As the upper boundary of the server is given (U s ), which means that the total (legitimate and attack) passing traffic should be controlled under U s , we hope more and more legitimate traffic is passing to the server and at the same time the attack traffic passing rate will be reduced. Therefore, if the average legitimate passing rate P legitimate is much more than the average total passing rate P total (as shown in Equation (16)), and the average attack passing rate P attack is much less than total passing rate P total , then the actions of the method are efficiency.
The efficiency of action is defined as Equation (17). We hope the legitimate passing rate P legitimate is much more than the attack passing rate P attack , at the same time, we should also make sure the legitimate passing rate P legitimate is as much as possible.
B. BASELINES AND PARAMETER SETTING
We compare our CRLRT method with baseline methods (SIRT, FRT, MART, and LP) in both fixed attack location setting and dynamic attack location setting.
1) BASELINES
• Server-initiated Router Throttling (SIRT). As introduced in Section II-B. Each router agent shares the same throttling rate [9] . The server adjusts the throttling rate to make sure the accumulated traffic is within [L s , U s ] and sends back throttling rate information to each router agent.
• Fair Router Throttle (FRT). As introduced in II-C. Each throttling router has a different throttling rate [9] .
Each throttling agent adjusts its own throttling rate to make sure the accumulated traffic is within [L s , U s ].
• Multi-agent Router Throttling (MART). This method relies on only local information and there is no communication between each router.
• Linear Programming (LP). For the simulated environment, we can get the legitimate traffic x i t and attack traffic y i t . Thus, we can get the optimal result by LP as Equation (1) and (2) . Note that LP is hardly impossible to implement in reality, we only use it as an upper bound for all kinds of router throttling algorithms.
2) PARAMETER SETTING
During our experiment, the parameter of U s is set δ = 0.85 (refer (13)), the number of total router N = 108, the number of attack router N att = 54, the legitimate traffic x i t and attack traffic y i t is sampled from a different Gaussian distribution, the legitimate traffic of large-scale x i t ∼ N (1000,100), mediascale x i t ∼ N (800,100), and small-scale x i t ∼ N (600,100), y i t ∼ N (800,100).
To make fair comparisons, we adopt a grid search [41] , [42] to find the optimal parameter for each algorithms. The optimal parameter of SIRT is a 0 = 0, β = 0.05, α = 0.2, L s = 0.9 × U s , we can refer (4) for detail definition. The optimal parameter of FRT is R s (0) = U s /50, β = 0.05, α = 0.5, L s = 0.8 × U s , we can refer (6) for detail definition. Our reinforcement learning algorithm is DDPG, the DDPG framework and parameter during training period are shown in Table. 1. Each layer is connected with an ReLU [43] , [44] function, the optimizer of the network is Adam [45] . The explore noise is begin with 0.2, and each step decrease with 0.2/Menory-size, end with 0.001. The training period lasts for 900 episodes, and the test period lasts for 100 episodes, each episode lasts for 500 time steps, the attack traffic occurs in the first 300 time steps. We compare the metrics of different methods in both fixed attack location setting and dynamic attack location setting.
C. FIXED ATTACK LOCATION
For the fixed attack location setting, the location of attack agents is fixed during training and test period and with the same reward function. To validate the centralized decision is better than the decentralized decision in this environment setting, we plot the reward curve of MART and CRLRT during the test period, as illustrated in Fig.6 , here, y i t ∼ N (800,100), δ = 0.85. The training period of reinforcement learning is a little different from supervised learning, as reinforcement learning need to explore new action during training, the learning curve will rise volatility. From the darker area of Fig.6 , we can see that the training period of our CRLRT method tends to be more stable than the MART method. And our method can learn an ideal policy faster than MART, as our CRLRT can get the reward of 0.9 in the first 10000 steps.
We then compare curriculum learning with directly learning. Here, y i t ∼ N (800,100), δ = 0.85. We plot the training period of curriculum learning and directly learning in Fig.7(a) . Here, we plot the average reward of each 1000 time steps for display and comparison more clearly. We also plot the test period in Fig.7(b) , here we just show the first 10 episode result for display and comparison more clearly. From Fig.7(a) , we can see that the training period of our CRLRT with curriculum learning tends to be more stable than directly learning. From Fig.7(b) , we can see that the policy learned by CRLRT with curriculum learning is much better than directly learning, the test reward result of our CRLRT with curriculum learning is around 0.9, while the directly learning reward is very unstable, and the reward is around 0.8, much less than our reward result of 0.9.
We also compared our reward function with prior reward function of MART. Here, y i t ∼ N (800,100), δ = 0.85. From Fig.8(a) , we can see that our training stage is not stable as the stage of prior reward, this is due to our environment setting is more complicated and more reality than prior environment setting, but the average reward of our reward function is a little higher than the prior reward function. From Fig.8(b) , we can see that the policy learned by CRLRT with our reward function is a little better than the prior reward function of MART.
The test reward of different methods is shown in Fig.9 . Here, in order to show more clearly, we just plot the first 10 episodes of reward. From the result, we can see that the performance of CRLRT is best among these methods besides Linear Programming (LP). The LP method can achieve a very high reward because it supposes that we could know the legitimate traffic x i t and attack traffic y i t in advance, but in reality, we can not know this information in advance. The result of the LP method can just be an optimal result for comparison. The reward curve of CRLRT-LC is a little worse than CRLRT, as the central agent of CRLRT-LC method used less information than CRLRT. There is still a big gap between our result with the optimal result got by LP. In order to analyze the efficiency of actions learned by each method. We list the total passing rate P total , the legitimate passing rate P legitimate , and the attack passing rate P attack (refer (14) ). They are used to calculate the action efficiency E action (refer (17) ) during test period. We hope P total , P legitimate and E action to be as large as possible, the P attack to be as small as possible. The metrics result of different methods is shown in Table. 2. We can see that the action efficiency of SIRT, FRT and, MART is quite poor. We save the action result of MART and can find that all agents take similar actions, which indicates that the actions are useless, thus the action efficiency of MART is the worst of all. The action efficiency E action of LP, our CRLRT, and CRLRT-LC is consistent with the result showed in Fig.9 . Our CRLRT is better than other methods besides the LP method, and our CRLRT-LC is a little worse than CRLRT as CRLRT-LC uses less information.
D. DYNAMIC ATTACK LOCATION
As in reality, the attacker can dynamically change the attack location to avoid been detected. For dynamic attack location setting, the location of attack agents is dynamically changed for each episode and test period. The parameter setting is the same as the fixed attack location environment. We first generate 200 different attack locations. During the 900 episodes training period, use the first 100 attack location repeatedly. During test 100 episodes, use the left 100 attack location for the test of the learned policy. The test reward of different methods in the dynamic attack location setting is shown in Fig.10 . Here, we also just plot the first 10 episodes of reward. From the result, we can see that the reward of each method is similar to Fig.9 . In the dynamic attack location, the reward of Linear Programming (LP) has an obvious fluctuation. CRLRT is still best among these In order to analyze the efficiency of actions learned by each method in the dynamic attack location setting. We also list the total passing rate P total , the legitimate passing rate P legitimate , and the attack passing rate P attack , and the action efficiency E action during test period as shown in Table. 3. The table setting is similar to Table. 2. We can see that the result of SIRT, FRT, MART, and LP in dynamic attack location setting is similar to the fixed attack location setting, but the result of our CRLRT and CRLRT-LC in dynamic attack location setting is much less than fixed attack location setting. This is mainly because that the SIRT, FRT, and LP only use the traffic reading itself, do not care about the location of attack routers. But our CRLRT and CRLRT-LC are influenced by the attack location, as different attack location will lead to a quite different state for agents. The result of LP, our CRLRT, and CRLRT-LC is consistent with the result showed in Fig.10 . The LP result is still the best, our CRLRT is better than other methods besides the LP method, and CRLRT-LC is a little worse than CRLRT.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to solve the Partial Observability Markov Decision Problem of the DDoS attack, we make three contributions to mitigate the effect of the DDoS attack. First, we propose a Centralized Reinforcement Learning Router Throttling with Less Communication (CRLRT-LC) method to defend DDoS attacks. The central router makes a decision for each router to choose the throttling rate. Second, we simulate the environment of the DDoS problem more realistic and modify the reward function of MART to make the reward function more coherent. Third, we add a DDPG network for each router to decrease the communication time. For this DDoS problem, experimental results validate that our methods outperform existing router throttling methods. But there is still a big gap between our result with the optimal result produced by Linear Programming (LP), especially in dynamic attack location setting.
In future work, first, we will try to adopt imitate learning to imitate the policy of LP. Second, we will extend our work to a larger scale network using Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning. Third, we will add communication delay to the communication to make the environment setting more realistic.
